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IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY: DIFFERENCES AT 
HEART AND FUTURES-TO-COME
Wolff-Michael Roth, University of Victoria
Abstract: Identity and community are two theoretical terms educators use for theorizing and understanding what 
happens in classrooms and for designing curriculum. There are, however, serious theoretical difficulties and incongruities 
in which the two terms are thought, which arise from the underlying ontology of the same. In this article, I propose to think 
the two terms within a different ontology, one that thinks difference not in terms of its deviation from the same but that 
thinks difference-in-and-for-itself. This then allows us to understand identity and community as non-self-identical entities 
that embody change, that is, entities that have change as a constitutive feature. That is, difference-in-and-for-itself leads 
us to a process ontology that is consistent with past (Bakhtin, Bergson, Husserl) and present (Deleuze, Derrida, Nancy) 
philosophical approaches to change, evolution, and difference. To concretize my argument, I provide (a) a computer model 
of collective decision making as an analogy and (b) concrete examples from a second-grade mathematics lesson.
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For it is not the other which is another I, but the I 
which is an other, a fractured I.... In the psychic system 
of the I–Self, the Other thus functions as a centre of 
enwinding, envelopment or implication. It is the 
representative of the individuating factors. (Deleuze, 
1968/1994, p. 61)
The One guards against/keeps some of the other. It 
protects itself from the other, but, in the movement of 
this jealous violence, it comprises in itself, thus guarding 
it, the self-otherness or self-difference (the difference 
from within oneself) which make it One. The “One 
differing, deferring from itself.” The One as the Other. 
(Derrida, 1996, p. 78)
Every culture is in itself “multicultural,” not only 
because there is a prior acculturation or because there 
is no pure and simple provenance, but more importantly 
because the gesture of culture is itself a gesture of mêlée: 
it’s to confront, transform, deviate, develop, recompose, 
combine, cobbling together. (Nancy, 2003, p. 283, my 
translation)
Identity and community are theoretical terms 
denoting particular experiences that arise from 
participation in human, cultural-historically contin-
gent society. Although sociocultural and cultural-
historical researchers have drawn on the way these 
concepts have been formulated within the tradition, 
they generally have not carried forward the funda-
mentally dialectical materialist way of thinking that 
has been central to the efforts of the ancestors of 
these theories (Hegel, Marx, Vygotsky, Leont’ev). 
In contrast, some of the recent work concerning the 
two concepts does in fact use an inherently dialec-
tical approach as exemplified in the introductory 
quotes. Thus, the first two quotes suggest that one 
cannot understand identity (“I,” “Self,” the “One”) 
without understanding the Other; the third quote 
suggests—in contrast to much of the going litera-
ture—that every (community’s) culture inherently 
is multicultural, that it is different wherever we 
look, and that it is not a unitary, homogeneous solid 
defined by periphery and center. In some approaches 
to dialectics (Hegel but not Marx), Self and Other 
would be defined as mutual opposites, negatives 
(negations) of one another—in a Venn diagram, one 
term would then be on the inside of a circle (A) and 
the other constitute everything on the outside (¬A 
or not-A). There are some inherent weaknesses in 
thinking the concepts of identity and community 
in terms of opposites and oppositions, inside and 
outside, newcomer and old-timer.
In this article, I take a different route to theorizing 
identity and community by starting with a different 
ontology, one that articulates the processes, flow, 
and development of community and identity and 
therefore their historicity and contingency. Rather 
than opposing the Other and the Self as self-iden-
tical contraries, philosophers of difference show how 
the Self has to be understood as inherently Other, 
not as its negative but other as a central aspect of its 
constitution. Rather than understanding culture (or 
any other aspect of human life for that matter) as 
one (the “One” in the quote from Derrida) I under-
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stand it as a plural singular. Self and Other, who are 
part of and constitute community, are implicated in 
one another, inseparably a One and a Many, simul-
taneously singular and plural in nature; and culture 
always is non-self-identical and thus heterogeneous, 
always is a mêlée of cultures brushing up against 
one another. Culture always is other than itself and, 
therefore in a strong sense, is not. Here I articulate a 
position with respect to community and identity that 
does not treat these concepts and the phenomena 
that they denote as self-identical but as different from 
themselves. I take each concept (phenomenon) to be 
a process of “heterogenesis, that is, an ordering of 
its moments by zones of neighborhood” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1991/2005, p. 26, my translation), where its 
constitution of “moments” means that it cannot ever 
be a unitary entity but always constitutes a difference 
at heart. This difference at the heart of the word and 
the theoretical power deriving from it have already 
been articulated in the statement that “it is precisely 
the internal dialogism of the word, which does not 
assume any external dialogism of the word... that 
has so much power to shape style” (Bakhtin, 1981, 
p. 279, my emphasis). This difference within the 
object and word then allows me to better theorize 
and model the kinds of communities and identi-
ties that we actually observe, always contradictory, 
always singular and plural simultaneously, always 
reproducing themselves differently in a process of 
eternal return, embodying difference at the very heart 
of identity. But how can we think of difference in and 
for itself, especially as it leads to the non-self-identity 
of the Self? In the following, I provide an analogy 
that shows how we can think the individual and the 
collective so that they no longer exist for themselves 
but always implicate the other, that is, always imply 
a plural singular. I then provide an example from 
a second-grade mathematics lesson exhibiting the 
heterogeneity and hybridity of individuals and the 
collective they constitute consistent with the analogy 
and the three quotes that begin this chapter.
Difference-in-and-for-Itself
As an alternative to existing approaches, I have 
adopted into my theoretical repertoire the concept 
of difference-in-and-for-itself or, alternatively, of 
the singular plural (Nancy, 2000), which embodies 
difference and otherness at the heart of identity 
(which therefore cannot be identical to itself). And 
because the future-not-yet is part of Self and commu-
nity, neither phenomenon is but always also consti-
tutes the future-to-come (à-venir). Accordingly, any 
singularity (Self, Other, community) is what it is 
only in and through its relation to all other singu-
larities including itself (self-relation), that is, in rela-
tion to the plurality. The plurality, as such, itself is a 
singularity, constituted by the multiplicity of existing 
singularities.
To make this concept of the singular plural more 
concrete, I use the case of constraint satisfaction 
networks, which has been employed in the literature 
to model decision-making in complex social situ-
ations (e.g., Hutchins, 1995). In its concreteness, 
the case simplifies things, but dangerously so if it is 
taken-as-such. I am using it as an entry point for my 
readers to bootstrap my paper into its argument– so 
that the bootstrap itself constitutes a beginning before 
the beginning.
A network (“community”) consists of some 
number of “singularities” (persons, here n = 6); the 
value (identity) of any node at state t+1 depends 
on the values of all nodes, including itself, at state 
t (Figure 1a) 1. That is, no node is stable, and the 
value of a node in the next instance cannot be taken 
from the node itself (with a self-relation of 1 or some 
other value, which would mean, it is not reproduced 
identically) or from the ensemble of nodes. (Matrices 
that are asymmetrical model “power relations,” that 
is, for which the influence of S
1
 on S
2
 is different from 
the relation of S
2
 on S
1
, that is, a
12
 ≠ a
21
.) Given one 
or more reference points—e.g., the states where the 
nodes all have either value 0 or 1—any state of the 
network can be given in terms of its distance from 
the reference point. As soon as one new node is 
added, the configuration as a whole changes (Figure 
1b) because of the additional relations that define the 
ensemble 2.
Because the network undergoes continual change 
unless trapped in one of the extreme positions, no 
individual node ever is, in the same way that a photo-
graph never is the living person: each state consti-
tutes a snapshot of a process and stands in the same 
precarious relation to what it is (its being) in the 
same way that a photograph stands in relation to the 
person (when a person says looking at a photograph 
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of herself, “I don’t like it, this is not me”). This situ-
ation is not improved when we animate the states 
like a movie animates still pictures, which return to 
their still states as soon as one stops the reel. Such an 
animation always comes from the outside and does 
not present or reflect the internal forces that change 
the system from within itself. We therefore have to 
think the nodes in terms of their movement from t to 
t+1: They only are in and through this movement, that 
is, in terms of their becoming. Such a network there-
fore never is characterized by the values its nodes take 
at a particular point in time but only how it behaves 
under given conditions. All of this also leads us to a 
situation where the relation of any node (member) of 
the network is a relation to all other nodes (members), 
that is, in the final instance therefore, a relation of the 
network to itself. The unity of this network (commu-
nity) as a whole therefore is that of a self-relation of 
a plurality of members. In this network, therefore, all 
the members are equal despite their differences.
Networks (“communities”) such as the one 
described exhibit interesting behaviors even in the 
symmetrical case of mutual influence (a
ij
 = a
ji
) and 
even in the case that the a
ij
 are held constant. Let us 
think of a small community of practice (n = 6)—such 
as the committees making funding decisions—in 
which there is a positive reinforcing influence 
between the practices/identities among individuals 
1–3 and 4–6 and a negative influence (e.g., “critique”) 
between the members of the first and second group. 
Figure 2 provides five different trajectories of the 
system as a function of different starting points where 
the community defining practice(s) has (have) are yet 
to be developed. These trajectories cannot be given 
in closed mathematical form, as they are sensitive to 
variations in initial conditions—set random in the 
present modeling exercise—and to minor distur-
bances along the trajectory (not modeled here).
Figure 1. An example for thinking the singular plural and difference in and for itself. 
Figure 2. Trajectories of a community toward more stable practices A (ii), B (i, iii), or the co-presence of practices A and B (iv, v).
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Cases (i) and (ii) are the ones with histories 
that one might expect, where the community with 
initial inclinations for practices B and A ends up 
with these practices as steady states. However, the 
three other cases are the more interesting ones in 
this simple simulation. Thus, trajectory (iii) is that 
of the community, beginning with a greater inclina-
tion for practice A, nevertheless ends with practice 
B as the steady state (its end state is far away from 
practice A) and this despite an initial movement 
away from its final practice. Trajectories (iv) and (v) 
correspond to communities that begin with greater 
inclinations for A and B but end up with a final state 
where both practices are maintained simultaneously, 
that is, there is not one but there are two defining 
practices within the community. It can easily be seen 
that despite beginning near each other, trajectories 
ii, iii, and iv lead to very different end states in the 
development of the community.
The trajectories in Figure 2 are but representa-
tions of the trajectory of the system (in distance space 
relative to two fixed points) as a whole, constituted 
by the plurality of individuals and their relations, 
each of which also is on an individual trajectory. 
During the entire trajectory, each node is in continual 
transition (mathematically, the value) and so is the 
collection of nodes as a whole: the network therefore 
is better characterized by its tendencies rather than 
by its states, which already embody and are consti-
tuted by the possibilities for the next states, that is, 
their own and collective future-not-yet. The value of 
each node (i.e., its “identity) is a (non-linear) func-
tion of the node collective, which exists only in as far 
as it is concretely realized in the individual nodes. 
Therefore, both taken individually and collectively, 
the nodes exhibit singularity and plurality.
In my current thinking, this approach constitutes 
an interesting model for the transformation of a class 
of students, such as the second-grade mathematics 
class that I use as a case in point below. Because of 
their mutually constitutive nature, individuals and 
collective are thought together; and any beginning 
implicates the future-not-yet that each individual for 
him/herself and the collective as a whole achieves. 
Thus, the mathematical nature of second-grade 
students’ classification efforts, as I show in the next 
section, already is prefigured as a possibility along-
side the non-mathematical classifications they begin 
with. The individual trajectories are not relative to 
some fixed community, but each individual trajec-
tory is constitutive of the collective trajectory, which 
reduces the theoretical usefulness of notions such 
as “from periphery to center” as used in much of 
the research on “communities of practice.” There 
is no one center or margin that is privileged inher-
ently, for any center and any margin is constructed 
as such by drawing arbitrary boundaries in an open 
space of continual becoming. Rather, there are as 
many centers as there are observers and constitutive 
members, each positioned, each dispositioned, each 
associated with suppositions and presuppositions. The 
truth, then, lies in the multiplicity of the phenom-
enon, here both individual and community, neither 
of which can be reduced to the other and neither of 
which has a self-identical core (e.g., the “old-timers” 
who characterize the core in Situated Learning).
These trajectories suggest that we end up with 
different communities of practice—when viewed as 
a self-identical system—depending on minor varia-
tions in initial conditions and along the trajectories. 
In fact, there is no one community of practice but 
a continually changing plurality of ever changing 
practices—the heteroglossia found on the lower 
socio-ideological levels “on the stages of local fairs 
and at buffoon spectacles” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 273). 
For Bakhtin, in an interesting reversal of social 
change, the heteroglossia of the “lower socio-ideo-
logical levels” is the driver of linguistic and cultural 
changes, including the ones observed in “high” 
literature (Bakhtin, 1986). In my example, minor 
variations of the parameters relating any two nodes 
also change the historical trajectory of the system as 
a whole and that of each individual. To make the 
model more complex and fitting the complexity of 
the modeled phenomenon, we may add an external 
influence, for example, modeling the teacher, which 
tends to constrain the system to move more toward 
one rather than another final state—even though this 
cannot be deterministically ascertained unless the 
model contains unreasonable parameters.
This approach has consequences. For example, 
time no longer is external physical time—e.g., 
measuring length of school years, developmental age, 
length of curricular units—there is an internal time 
associated with such systems that is distinctly diffe-
rent from the external time theorized and measured 
IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY: DIFFERENCES AT HEART AND FUTURES-TO-COME
Wolff-Michael Roth
103
in the natural sciences (Prigogine & Stengers, 
1979). The “age” of such a system is a function of 
the transformations, that is, of the successive states 
of a system that integrates itself over and, in this, 
becomes path dependent. This also is at the origin 
of the qualitative diversity of our world, which is 
different from nature and culture thought in terms 
of conformity with itself. In this change or rather the 
experienced duration, there is a memory interior to 
the duration–transition similar to the one that are 
missing in traditional conceptualizations of commu-
nity of practice as used in educational research: 
It is an interior memory but not personal memory 
exterior to the thing it retains, distinct from a past of 
which it guarantees its conservation; it is a memory 
internal to the change itself, a memory that prolongs 
the after in the before and which prevents them to be 
pure instants that appear and disappear in a present 
that is reborn without end. (Bergson, 1922, p. 35, my 
translation)
This form of memory is internal in systems such 
as the one I model here; it is internal to the commu-
nities that we have come to know about by reading 
Situated Learning; and it is internal to the French 
village school of Moussac, where individual students 
and the teacher do not have to think about what the 
practice looked liked last year or the year before, but 
where the structure reproduces itself and changes in 
every action (Roth & Lee, 2006). But this form of 
memory disappears in normal classrooms, which are 
constituted at the beginning of the year for this or 
that administrative decision and which are disassem-
bled, reconstituted, and assigned to new teachers at 
the transition points between the end of one school 
year and the beginning of the next.
Elaboration of the Problematic
The relationship between individual (Self) 
and collective (Self, Other) as well as the relation-
ship between cultures and their concrete practices 
are central to sociocultural and cultural-historical 
approaches to understanding human (societally moti-
vated) activities 3. Yet there are problems and logical 
contradictions in research using these theoretical 
frameworks 4. Here I present a way to realize the 
Hegel–Marx–Vygotsky–Leont’ev program of under-
standing the subject of activity and, correlatively, 
of understanding the (the culture of the) commu-
nity with which individuals stand in an irreducible, 
because mutually constitutive relationship. In my 
way of understanding, as shown in the relations that 
constitute a constraint satisfaction network, each 
singular entity (concept) is understood as a multi-
plicity, a plurality, and therefore bears at its very 
heart an inner contradiction that eschews all reduc-
tion of cognition to the individual or to the collective 
(community) 5. But each plurality also constitutes a 
singularity.
Much recent work on identity and activity has 
shown how participation in activity constitutes iden-
tity as much as identity constitutes a resource for 
participating in activity and therefore constitutes a 
resource for knowing and learning (e.g., Holland et 
al., 1998; Holland & Lave, 2001). Although sociocul-
tural and cultural-historical activity theories radically 
depart from other psychological approaches in their 
conception of identity and community, many if not 
most (Western) researchers drawing on these and 
related theoretical frameworks share with the latter a 
fundamental starting point: the ontological commit-
ment to the Same. Thus, for example, community (of 
practice) is taken as a unitary, self-identical entity 
(being) that defines membership, level of compe-
tence (where an individual finds him-/herself along 
the trajectory from periphery to core participation); 
in this way, the heterogeneity at the very heart of 
community as phenomenon and theoretical term 
only exists as difference along a scale (e.g., newcomer 
to old-timer, periphery to core), which is not a differ-
ence at all (Hegel, 1806/1977). The problem with an 
ontology of the Same is that it defines difference as 
deviation from a self-identical entity, which inher-
ently leads to the Kantian position of the power of 
knowledge that determines the conditions of possi-
bility, representationalism (knowledge in the head), 
the isolation of the self from its societal and material 
context, and to the grounding of identity in intention-
ality and consciousness of self (Deleuze, 1968/1994). 
Invariably, for example, researchers pledge allegiance 
to Lev Vygotsky and then theorize learning as a 
movement of publicly constructed knowledge into 
the person in a process of internalization. Here inside 
and outside the person (individual, psychology) are 
opposites and learning is conceived of as the move-
ment of something from the Other on the outside 
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(interpsychological plane) to the Self on the inside 
(intrapsychological plane, community and culture).
An important work for mediating current under-
standings of community and identity has been 
Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991). In it, the community and 
its culture are more or less stable features of societal 
life and the changes individuals undergo are theo-
rized in terms of legitimate peripheral participation 
that takes them from newcomer to old-timer status 
and core participation 6. In and through participa-
tion, the individual then comes to be “in the image 
of” the community—a fact especially clear in the 
way newcomers to Alcoholics Anonymous become 
old-timers as they appropriate the existing genres of 
telling their autobiographies. In the following, I take 
head on the fundamental contradiction articulated in 
Situated Learning: 
[A] major contradiction lies between legitimate 
peripheral participation as the main means of achieving 
continuity over generations for the community of 
practice, and the displacement inherent in the same 
process as full participants are replaced (directly or 
indirectly) by newcomers-become-old-timers. (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991, p. 114)
The authors of Situated Learning go on to discuss 
the anthropological tradition of articulating this 
contradiction between continuity and renewal of a 
community, which is integral to learning. They state 
that this contradiction is “fundamental—a basic 
contradiction of social reproduction, transformation, 
and change” (p. 114). This particular contradiction 
arises only for researchers who frame the problem 
in terms of communities and participants that are 
self-identical rather than heterogeneous processes in 
and of flux (durée). Continuity (in flux) and inherent 
displacement go together without contradiction 
(Bergson, 1907/1969). Despite its good intentions, 
there are many other passages in Situated Learning 
that foster readings that militate against an appro-
priate understanding and theory of community and, 
correlatively, of identity, person, and Self.
To escape the problems that arise from an ontology 
of a self-identical Same (Lat. idem, which is the 
etymological precursor of identity), I work out here, 
with concrete examples from my research a theory of 
identity and community grounded in a philosophy of 
difference—a theoretical position and tradition that 
ranges from Hegel to Marx to Vygotsky to Leont’ev 
and to the French philosophy of difference of the late 
20 th and early 21 st century. Accordingly, difference 
and heterogeneity, because they constitute the heart 
of entities and persons, are the norm rather than 
something defined in terms of deviation from, and 
therefore less than, sameness: Identity and commu-
nity then no longer are consciousness of self; they are 
relations to the other than self and awakening. This 
ontological starting point allows me to frame identity 
in terms of hybridity and heterogeneity as positive 
concepts for theorizing the experiences of learning 
science and mathematics in and out-of-schools. This 
approach also allows me to overcome three disadvan-
tages associated with other theories:
1. It is not advantageous to think community in 
terms of direct or indirect replacement of 
newcomers who become old-timers; rather, 
every act by anyone at any moment in time 
constitutes change—which allows us to under-
stand the rapid cultural changes that may occur, 
for example, with the introduction of a new tool 
(mobile phone) in a culture, a change that is 
more rapid than changes by replacement;
2. It is not advantageous to think communities in 
terms of observed practices but instead we gain 
substantial theoretical leverage when we look 
at a community and culture in terms of action 
possibilities that exist at the collective levels, 
possibilities that change with new resources 
provided in every single (productive) act;
3. It is not advantageous to think the individual in 
terms of a core identity that is unchanging or 
correlatively, in terms of a fractured self that 
changes with the societal setting, that is, to think 
identity in terms of something that is ontologi-
cally identical with itself (A = A). A different 
approach might be to equate the process of 
equating something with something else as iden-
tity, which thereby becomes a process
An ontology of difference presupposes entities to 
be non-self-identical with themselves, inherently in 
flux between past achievements and future-not-yet.
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Community and Identity in a Mathematics 
Lesson
Recently a mathematics education colleague 
(Jennifer Thom) and I have begun a project on the 
role of the body in the learning of mathematical 
concepts. Locating cognition in the body comes with 
the potential danger of overly psychologizing math-
ematics (an essentially constructivist position) by 
failing to pay heed to constitutive relations that bind 
individual and collective. For me, the fundamental 
question of this research is how mathematics comes 
to be reproduced all the while recognizing that in the 
singularity of children’s productive actions, it never 
is identically repeated. As I am pondering atten-
dant theoretical issues, I come to think of repetition 
and difference in mathematical practices in a new 
way, especially as these pertain to the questions of 
community and identity. Here, I use one particular 
sorting task from the curricular unit as a concrete 
situation as a basis for my discussion of attendant 
issues. By means of this and other tasks, children are 
to be introduced to geometry; in fact, by bringing 
about a particular kind of sorting, the children are 
said to have learned (a little bit of) geometry. In 
other words, by producing the categorization of all 
mystery objects, the children reproduce geometry as 
a field and their actions can be recognized within the 
general semantic and practical fields characterized by 
the adjective geometrical. How can children’s produc-
tions be geometrical if the children do not think 
geometrically at the beginning of the lesson? The 
answer is that problem lies not with the children but 
in the framing of learning in terms of states—much 
like Zeno’s problem is one of framing motion in terms 
of successive states 7. That is, if we consider children 
and community as hybrids of the immediate past and 
the (from emergence resulting) future-not-yet, then 
there is no contradiction between the novel produc-
tion that each act constitutes and the reproduction 
of culture: the two are not independent processes 
but one. That is, in acting, children change and they 
do so independently of the question of whether they 
had placed their object within an existing ([non-] 
empty) collection in a legitimate way 8. They change, 
and with it changes their collectivity, in and through 
the act of placing the object wherever this may be, 
because their acts and associated results give rise to 
new transactional possibilities that subsequently are 
realized within the collective.
The Sorting Task, Collectively
The sorting task that constituted the first and 
introductory lesson of the curriculum unit required 
the participating second-grade students to pull a 
“mystery object” from a black plastic bag and then 
place it with an existing group (collection, category) 
of objects or create a new group (Figure 3) 9. To start 
the task, the teacher has pulled an object, has placed 
it on a colored sheet, and thereby has begun a first 
group. Each of the 22 children in the class has its 
turn to pull and place/sort an object. At the end of 
the lesson, all 22 students have placed their objects. 
But in every single case, students do not initially 
articulate a rationale for the placement (grouping) of 
their object. The teacher then invites them to artic-
ulate their thinking, that is, to produce predicates 
that explain why they have placed their object in a 
particular group (“Now can you tell us what you are 
thinking?” “Explain your thinking!” “You have to tell 
us why!” “Before going on, explain your thinking!” 
“Don’t go away, tell us why you put it there?”).
Figure 3. A moment in the “sort-the-mystery-object” task, where each child gets a turn in sorting an initially unknown object 
by placing it, as shown on an occupied or unoccupied colored sheet, each representing a (named) collection of like objects.
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As part of articulating similarities and differences, 
the present students hold their mystery objects next 
to others providing explanations such as “this is the 
closest object to it” or running their fingers across 
the mystery and comparison objects, running fingers 
along edges and corners and naming them as such, 
articulating roundness or noting the absence of sides 
(sphere). In the end, the children—in, through, and 
mediated by transactions with the teachers—produce 
a classification consistent with geometrical properties 
as these have emerged in the history of geometry. 
That is, as an outcome of their situated work and 
mediated by the teacher, the children collectively 
reproduced geometry as a science. (Figure 3 shows 
the situation near the end of the collective sorting 
episode.) Although this is a first lesson, the children’s 
actions, grounded in their everyday experience of 
the world, have become geometrical in and by re/
producing geometry in a recognizable way—though 
also in ways characteristically different from what 
adult geometers might have done. In terms of the 
analogy provided earlier, the classroom collective, 
consisting of the singular actions of students, ended 
up in one of the reference states (Figure 2, trajecto-
ries i or ii).
Throughout the lesson, the teacher also reiterates 
other utterances that adults can hear as instructions: 
“Just take the first one you feel!” or “The first one 
you feel!” The sorting activity began with the teach-
er’s articulation of the rules relating to color and 
size. In the course of this part of the lesson, many 
children use size to articulate similarities and differ-
ences between objects, followed, when applicable 
by the teacher’s reiteration of the rules. As a result 
of the teacher contributions, the sorting session 
comes to be orchestrated, the teachers being in the 
conductor position, stating, restating, and reiterating 
instructions and rules. But this is the orchestration 
of a partially improvised session, because only the 
teacher knows the score and the children attempt 
to play such that it comes to be consistent with the 
score that they do not know at the time. If the teacher 
does not restate and reiterate a rule or instruction, 
the ongoing or immediately past act of classification 
and predication can be seen and heard as consistent 
with the (from the children hidden, yet to-be-discov-
ered) rules and instructions. It is seen and heard as a 
successful action so that now the rules and instruc-
tions are descriptions of what has happened. After 
the fact, the rules and instructions may be said to 
have led to the successful classificatory act. We can 
therefore understand the teacher as the additional 
node in Figure 1b, which, in its interaction with 
all the nodes, radically changes the collective as a 
whole, constituting a force that pulls the system 
(community) toward a desired endpoint of the trajec-
tory (standard geometry as reference point for the 
community). But we still need to think the children 
as individual actors so that the lesson could have 
turned out otherwise as well (e.g., in the way it does 
in lessons that mathematics educators take as occa-
sions for complaining that elementary teachers lack 
mathematical knowledge to teach better lessons).
At the end of the lesson, geometry (as praxis 
rather than as body of knowledge) emerges from 
the sorting task. The children, as members to the 
organized arrangements of this mathematics class-
room are deciding, recognizing, and making evident 
the rational, coherent, chosen, planful, effective, 
methodical, and knowledgeable character of their 
inquiries as sorting, classifying, providing reasons, 
and so on. What is at issue for me in the present case 
is the role of identity and community with respect 
to geometry-in-the-making rather than to its ready-
made counterpart that appears in books because 
across time, geometry, as an ideal object, can exist 
only in and through a second layer, the sensually 
embodied practices that localize and temporalize 
(e.g., Euclidean) geometry as non-local and non-
temporal ideality (Husserl, 1939). Even though it 
could not be predicted from the children’s actions 
prior to the unit (their practices were somewhere 
in the middle of Figure 2), standard geometry (one 
categorization practice associated with a corner point 
in Figure 2) emerged in and through their actions 
and the corrective feedback (constraints) provided 
through the teacher’s utterances. Theorizing commu-
nity-in-the-making means that we have to include the 
future-not-yet, that which can unpredictably emerge 
from the current conditions as the ground and mate-
rial. If we do not do so, no community of geometry 
would have come off the ground of the utterly non-
geometrical thinking that existed prior to its emer-
gence (prior to Euclid and other early geometers). 
More so, at the very moment the first geometrical 
theorems emerge, they are intelligible generally, 
which means, they have had to realize possibilities 
that already pre-existed.
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Community then can be thought here in two 
ways. On the one hand, there is the particular class-
room where participants have something in common 
(Lat. communis), thereby constituting something 
that can be called community. On the other hand, 
there are and have been people doing similar kinds 
of things in the past and present, sorting geometri-
cally, so that these students and their teacher have 
something in common with a community of geom-
eters. The production and reproduction of geometry 
occurs with respect to the latter, whereas the former 
is more of a collection of individual brought together 
for administrative purposes.
The community of geometers is important to 
the school subject because the objective nature of 
geometry exists in and through the emergence of 
geometry in the practical (material) actions of real, 
embodied, sensual human beings. Standard geom-
etry emerges although no action has to be identical 
to any other action produced. It is in its contingent 
production that geometry as objective science can be 
reproduced across generations, thereby producing 
and reproducing a geometry community broadly 
conceived, one that includes society as a whole. It 
is not therefore that this (or, for that matter, any) 
geometry lesson causes students to do certain things; 
nor is it that in their actions, students produce geom-
etry anew. Rather, the ideal and material nature of 
geometry as objective science emerges each time 
when a “member” produces and thereby reproduces 
practices that recognizably are both different and 
the same and therefore collectively geometrical in 
nature. Geometry emerges because it is part of the 
collectively (societally) possible way of acting in the 
present-day culture 10.
But for the community to be able to change 
because of internal reasons and mechnisms, its new 
state in the future-to-come (à-venir) already has to 
be implicated in the current state. In fact, commu-
nity thereby always comes to be other than itself, in 
continual suspension of being what it is and what it is 
not (yet). Community-in-the-making then is a process 
that simultaneously embodies the different states at t 
and t+1, which are but two sides of the same coin and 
where state t+1 may be an emergent one unpredict-
able from what is the case at t. Community-in-the-
making includes the possibilities of a future-not-yet, 
where I do not mean possibility in a metaphysical 
(Kantian) sense as logical possibility, derivable 
and foreseeable from current knowledge, but in a 
phenomenological sense, that which is phenomenally 
possible in excess over the calculable and explainable 
in terms of causes and present conditions. Readers 
will be familiar with phenomena denoted by the 
concept of emergence: here, too, future states of a 
system cannot be predicted from the current state. 
(A popular example exists in Bénard convection cells 
where molecules in a disorganized state line them-
selves up to move in hexagonal convection cells 
when the external conditions are appropriate.) If 
the children could have completed the sorting task 
without intervention based on what they knew and 
could deduce from this knowledge, they (at least 
some of them) likely would have done so consistent 
with classical geometry.
Taking this route then allows me to understand 
how geometry can emerge from everyday, completely 
non-geometrical practices: the non-geometrical from 
which geometry emerges constitutes an essential part 
of it, for the former constitutes the very ground on 
which geometry has culturally historically emerged 
and continues to emerge on the ontogenetic level 
with each child. The production and reproduction 
of society therefore also is at the heart of geometrical 
practice, including all those parts that currently 
are not recognized as constitutive of geometry. As 
members of society, children appropriate—and 
already have appropriated and available—many of 
the resources that are presupposed and required for 
doing geometry, which in fact constitute the very 
grounds and conditions for acting geometrically. 
Thus, these children competently classify objects—
though often according to color and size, which is 
against the rule of the (language) game they are to 
learn in this lesson.
We may take the events described here to 
constitute an instance of a mathematics classroom 
where the teacher endeavors to establish certain 
practices to promote changes along specific hypo-
thetical learning trajectories (Cobb, McClain, & 
Gravemeijer, 2003). But it also is the case that the 
teacher does a lot of work, which in other instances 
may be done by the community itself and without 
any or little teacher involvement in the planning of 
the curriculum (Roth & Lee, 2006). In the former 
case, the teacher is responsible for the reproduc-
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tion of culture from year to year, whereas in the 
latter case, there is a memory in the structure of 
the community itself. Such structural memory 
has been observed in the one-room school and 
village of Moussac (Poitou, France) community 
that Roth and Lee describe, which has reproduced 
itself and changed over a 20-year period with little 
direct teaching (Collot, 2002). Because each year 
the three or four oldest students (after the equiva-
lent of grade 6) left and about the same number of 
kindergarten-aged students joined, there existed a 
collective history and memory of established, but 
ever-changing practices in which newcomers to the 
school participated and which they contributed to 
transforming. Once established—this was the most 
difficult of Collot’s tasks—the community produced 
and reproduced itself. This was so even after he left 
and the school and village continued to produce 
and reproduce themselves with the new teacher of 
the school.
In my mathematics classroom, as the many 
cases that Paul Cobb has described over the years, 
this is not the case and—contrary to the reproduc-
tion of communities of practice in the everyday 
world outside schools—the respective teachers 
therefore build some “community” from scratch 
at the beginning of the year. That is, in terms of 
my example presented in Figure 2, each year the 
second-grade class of my teacher begins at some 
initial state, rather than continuing the trajectories 
that have begun years or decades before (as in the 
Moussac school). As soon as the students move on 
to work with a new teacher, the community has 
disappeared, and with it any collective memory 
that might be used as resource for reproducing and 
further changing both community and its prac-
tices. (Middle and high school teachers know from 
their experience that the sense of community also 
is disrupted when students change subject matter 
[and teacher], which always is associated with 
changes in the structure of events.)
Such structural memory is the very presuppo-
sition on which a science such as geometry—and 
the community that keeps it alive—persists. Thus, 
central to persistence of geometry is the neces-
sity of a structural nature that makes possible the 
everlasting mobility of a continual expansion in 
a horizon of geometric futures (Husserl, 1939). 
The community of geometers is not reproduced 
by means of handing down and appropriating 
of certain practices, but a continual synthesis in 
which the totality of prior achievements constitute 
the premise for future reproduction and develop-
ment. However, this totality of some future state 
could not have been evident at its beginning. Even 
though geometry has been invented and practiced 
by individuals it nevertheless has a dimension that 
from the very first moment on has been indepen-
dent of the subject (i.e., cultural) and curiously 
atemporal. This is characteristic of any scientific 
culture. But it tends not to be characteristic of 
school classrooms, which generally lack future 
effects after having been disassembled at the end of 
the year to be reconfigured anew in the subsequent 
school year.
A Moment in the Sorting Task, Individually
In the context of the global development, in fact 
constituting it in and through their actions, students 
not only change what they do (how they sort, how 
they articulate their rationales) but in the process 
exhibit and change who they are, that is, (part of) 
their mathematics (geometry)-related identities. 
The changes in the classroom as a whole cannot be 
theorized independent of the changes at the indi-
vidual level that constitute them. In the present, 
some students complete the task to the teacher’s 
satisfaction but others are asked to reconsider their 
classification and are encouraged to continue until 
they have placed their object consistent with a sort 
according to geometrical (shape) rather than other 
properties (color, size). Connor, characterized by 
the teacher as “weak in mathematics,” is one of 
the latter students. After pulling his mystery object 
from the black plastic bag—which geometrically 
knowledgeable observers recognize as cube—he 
creates a new category rather than placing it with 
the existing set of cubical objects. The teacher first 
requests a rationale, which he answers by stating 
that his object is bigger than others. The teacher 
initially restates the rules for the task (no sorting 
according to size or color), then encourages him 
to reconsider and compare his object with all the 
others, and eventually guides the student to place 
the object with the other cubes. The following 
exchange ensues.
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 58 T: cube. does it meet the 
criteria of having the square or the cube? ((looks at 
Colby sternly, nods while talking)) 
 59  (0.25)
 60 X: <<p>no>
 61  (0.25)
 62 T: do you think it does?
 63  (0.84)
 64 C: like what do you mean?
 65  (1.10)
 66 T: ‘does it match. We said 
THAT this group ((points)) was ‘squa::re (0.31) or cube 
(0.49) ((looks at Colby, nods)) does it match that? 
When the teacher speaks to Connor, she in fact 
presupposes his understanding even though the very 
lesson is designed to “teach him something he does 
not yet know.” Whatever is new to Connor in the 
teacher’s talk nevertheless has to be intelligible to him 
and therefore already has to be prefigured as possi-
bility in Connor’s exhibited understanding. Teaching 
would make little sense unless what is not yet known 
already is presupposed as possibility and exhibited 
in a forthcoming (discursive, manipulative) action. 
More so, because identity is tied to (others’ interpre-
tation of) exhibited actions, it includes both what 
currently is and what currently is not yet—acting in 
accordance with the rules of formal geometry. Connor 
therefore also is, what he is not yet but can be, that 
is, other than himself even though we may not be 
able to predict precisely on the basis of his current 
knowledgeability what his knowledgeability will be at 
any subsequent instant. (Cultural-historical activity 
theorists know about such contradictions, which are 
inherent in the object of activity, which includes both 
current states and materials and a vision of the future-
to-come.) Actions, knowledgeability, and identity that 
an individual student exhibits therefore cannot be so 
new, because they already exist as possibilities in his 
current actions, knowledge, and identity (practice). At 
the very moment Connor exhibits the desired actions 
for a first time, and therefore exhibits a certain form 
of knowledge and identity, it also is the knowledge 
and identity from the other—they already are recog-
nized and exist as possibilities in the culture gener-
ally—and it is knowledge and identity for the other, 
the recipient, his classmates, teacher, and society 
(which he reproduces in his Being). At the very heart 
of Connor’s actions, expressions of his Self, we also 
find the Other, who is at the origin of the possibili-
ties, the source, and recipient. That is, much like the 
nodes in my network example (Figure 1), we cannot 
understand Connor independent of the classroom 
and culture as a whole as he already exhibits knowl-
edgeabilities that are those of the others that have 
come from the other and, in his actions, return to the 
other. Current models of identity do not include what 
a person is not and therefore can theorize identity, 
and with it, community, only in terms of still images. 
A dynamic theory of identity, however, also needs 
to theorize what Connor can be in any next instant, 
including those facets that are emergent and in excess 
over the present. Theorizing in this way leads us to 
a concept of identity-in-the-making, of which identity 
always only is like a photograph in relation to the 
continuous unfolding of life that we experience and 
for which there never exists time out.
In the present situation, Connor “challenges” 
the assumption about his competence by asking 
the teacher what she means; or rather, his utterance 
becomes part of a question–answer pair as the teacher 
utters “‘does it match? We said that this group was 
square or cube does it match that?” (turn 66). We 
can hear this as an elaboration of her earlier utterance 
concerning the match between Connor’s mystery 
object and the criteria/name of the group where he 
placed it (turn 58). Learning and becoming there-
fore mean that the individual already is –if we can 
be anything at all –what s/he is not yet. And this is 
central to the recent formulation of the nature of Self: 
“Self is precisely without return to self; self does not 
become what it already is: becoming is being outside 
of self –but such that this outside, this ex-position, is 
the very being of the subject” (Nancy, 2002, p. 57).
In understanding the question as question, the 
teacher acknowledges the intelligibility of what 
Connor says, even though she might not agree with it 
and even though she might not understand what the 
trouble in understanding is. But in using (speaking or 
hearing) the English language, she presupposes the 
intelligibility of the said and Connor’s understanding 
thereof. The (generalized) Other, here concretized in 
and by Connor, is implicated in the very articulation 
of her Self (as teacher) in the same way that the value 
of each node in my network example (Figure 1) 
implicates the values of all other nodes. Similarly, 
Connor’s utterances cannot be understood as some-
thing that is singularly his own, an expression of his 
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subjectivity and singularity. Thus, when he utters 
“what do you mean?” he has to presuppose not only 
the intelligibility of each word of this utterance but 
also, aided by the prosody, the hearing of the utter-
ance as a question. Presupposing the intelligibility 
of the utterance means that his production is but 
one concrete realization that presupposes another 
concrete realization by the hearer, here the teacher. 
This is but an external manifestation of the internal 
dialogicity—i.e., non-self-identity—characteristic of 
the word as such (Bakhtin, 1981). Connor produces 
what we hear as a question for the other, drawing 
on language that has come to him from the Other, 
and which therefore, in and through the utterance, 
returns to the other. It is the Other, says Deleuze in 
my introductory quote, which functions as a center 
of enwinding, envelopment, and implication. In its 
very singularity, Connor’s utterance produces and 
reproduces a cultural possibility collectively avail-
able to many, that is, he reproduces the general 
(universal) as such. Mathematical understanding 
generally and participating in mathematical commu-
nicative exchanges more specifically fundamentally 
acknowledge community all the while individuals 
realize them concretely so that we always require a 
genetic phenomenological approach to understand 
understanding (Roth, Bowen, & Masciotra, 2002). 
Here, both speakers realize the cultural possibility of 
this form of understanding (of this topic).
Articulating the Contradictions
In their utterances, Connor and his teacher 
presuppose the intelligibility of what they say. But 
there is contradiction apparent in the situation: 
the teacher assumes the intelligibility of her utter-
ance “we’re not... counting size” despite the fact 
that Connor just has classified by size. That is, she 
presupposes that he understands although his most 
recent actions have been inconsistent with an earlier 
and repeatedly reiterated description of allowable 
and non-allowable actions and explanations for clas-
sifying objects (i.e., rules). There is another inner 
contradiction. Connor has been asked to sort the task 
according to geometrical properties, even though he 
does not yet know geometry. In fact, the knowledge 
(practice) required to do the sorting task is the very 
knowledge (practice) that the lesson is designed to 
have as its results.
In the process of the sorting, Connor’s actions 
not only accomplish the sorting and resorting of his 
mystery object, but they also constitute evidence for 
making attributions about his identity. For example, 
in contrast to some other students, Connor is asked 
to reconsider his initial decision and, after a lengthy 
exchange and articulation of reasons, he ultimately 
places his object within an existing class labeled 
“squares, cubes.” Here, the sequence of events and 
utterances that can be interpreted as “difficulties in 
understanding” may be used in support of a statement 
that “Connor has difficulties in mathematics,” “he is 
not a math wiz,” or that he “has learning disabilities, 
especially pertaining to mathematics.” In acting, we 
ex-scribe ourselves and thereby obtain “a being for 
others” (Hegel, 1806/1977, p. 189 [§316], original 
emphasis): the materiality of our actions lends itself 
to make attributions about our identities, about who 
we are, about our knowledgeabilities and competen-
cies. These identities are shared, collective possibili-
ties that allow Self and Other to “recognize themselves 
as mutually recognizing one another” (p. 112 [§184], 
original emphasis). However, actions that are possible 
but not yet realized are not captured in this way, for 
they are not yet seen precisely because the person 
does not know; and yet, they have to exist as possi-
bilities otherwise the person (Connor) would not be 
able to enact this knowledge in the next instant. Who 
we are generally and who Connor is particularly also 
is circumscribed by the actions that we could have 
performed instead because they are already within the 
range of our possibilities.
There are further contradictions in traditional 
ways of theorizing community, identity, and the rela-
tion between the two. Communities are not boxes 
into which individuals are enculturated by moving 
along a trajectory of legitimate peripheral participa-
tion. Individuals constitute communities as much 
as communities constitute individuals. Whatever 
any individual does constitutes community in all its 
diversity: each moment of participation, each action, 
and each expression is both marginal and central 
(Roth, Hwang, Lee, & Goulart, 2005). Whereas 
the constitutive effect of the individual is, in many 
instances, important in the world outside school, it 
tends to have little effect on schooling practices. It 
does matter very little to the mathematics class as a 
whole whether Connor classifies the object correctly 
or not, whether he is a math wizard or whether he 
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fails (which may lead, in some countries other than 
Canada, to repeating the grade). More so, if he is 
diagnosed with a learning disability—the aleatory 
nature of which has been well described by others 
(e.g., Mehan, 1993)—he might be assigned to special 
classes to be fixed (or to get his disability fixed) rather 
than be acknowledged for whatever special abilities 
he might contribute to the community at large.
Yet another contradiction can be framed as a ques-
tion: How can students produce and reproduce forms 
of geometrical knowledge unless they already embody 
the possibility of acting? The question is similar to 
the one that can be asked about the first human 
speaker ever: How can it make sense to have someone 
speak unless the very first utterance already presup-
poses its shared nature? At the very moment that 
the children produce and reproduce geometry they 
also reproduce both Self and Other. The resources 
available to them—the very patterns of actions that 
they have evolved from their birth to the moment 
of finding themselves with others of their age in this 
classroom—are cultural in nature. The actions they 
realize are those constitutive of the culture in this 
classroom, which is only one concrete realization of 
possibilities of doing geometry in the Anglo-Saxon 
(Canadian) culture more generally. That is, in the 
students’ actions, they both realize themselves (their 
Selfs) and more general, cultural possibilities that 
inherently are possibilities of the Other as well.
If the other, by the simple fact that I name it “other,” 
seems to presuppose the “one” or the “same,” and thus 
only to come later, this is the effect of a still abstract 
thought that has penetrated neither into the one nor 
into the other. The one does not begin: it beings with 
the other. With the other means near to the other, with 
the other at his place. (Nancy, 2002, p. 57)
At its very heart, each individual Self is marked 
by the Other, expresses itself using a language that 
is the language of the other, designed for the other, 
and returning to the other (who thereby has the 
resources and possibilities for responding in turn). 
Similarly, that an individual has possibilities that are 
not yet achieved points us to the heterogeneity of the 
Self (what I currently exhibit), which already is other 
than itself (my not-yet-realized action possibilities) 
in its embodiment of the future-not-yet. Otherness 
thereby becomes a defining characteristic of Self.
To me, therefore, the fundamental contradic-
tion is not the one outlined in Situated Learning but 
the non-self-identity of each, the individual and the 
community (culture), with itself. It is this claim 
that I work out in this article. According to Situated 
Learning, newcomers are caught in the dilemma 
that “they need to engage in the existing practice, 
which has developed over time: to understand it, to 
participate in it, and to become full members of the 
community in which it exists” (p. 115). In statements 
such as these, the practice is taken as something self-
identical, historically constituted and contingent in 
nature, but self-identical nevertheless. This becomes 
the stable framework for the newcomer both in terms 
of apprenticeship and in terms of evaluating the 
progress with respect to expertise (as defined by the 
“core members”). It also allows reading expertise as 
something that is different along the proposed trajec-
tory from periphery to core—and such differences, 
because they are continuous, are differences that are 
indifferent, that is, mean nothing within a dialectical 
theory (Hegel, 1806/1977).
Situated Learning continues with stating a second 
dilemma, whereby newcomers “have a stake in its 
[community’s] development as they begin to estab-
lish their own identity in its future” (p. 115). One of 
the tasks I set myself is to re-theorize the relation-
ship between individual and collective (“commu-
nity”), which, even in Situated Learning, can be read 
as constituting a box (e.g., “careers of newcomers 
in communities of practice” [p. 115, my emphasis]) 
into which newcomers enter and that is defined in 
terms of periphery and center. In particular, from the 
perspective I outline here, individual and community 
need to be thought in terms of processes, that is, as 
in-the-making, and therefore are other than them-
selves as they embody their own unpredictable devel-
opments and future-not-yet. It therefore is not as if 
newcomers begin to establish their own identity in its 
future, but this future already is here, in the form of 
indeterminately unfolding possibilities, constituting 
the very otherness of community and Self.
A different concept of action and the associated 
notion of practice (i.e., a “patterned action”) also is 
required. Anthropologists and educators frequently 
take a practice to encompass all that the members 
of a (sub-) culture can be observed to do, which is 
associated with the (cultural) artifacts that members 
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employ, deploy, and work on in the process. In this 
way, agency is entirely described in terms of what 
is observable. But this does not allow us to observe 
novelty, on the one hand, and makes us attribute 
innovation to individuals first observed to do some-
thing, on the other hand. This challenges our under-
standing of understanding: it does not account for 
how we can understand a form of discourse if it is 
new and innovative. And if we can understand an 
innovation it is because it already is encompassed and 
prefigured in our present collective understanding, 
as a possibility. There is not just one practice, nor 
is there simply a multiplicity of (observed, self-
identical) practices: there is a multiplicity always-
changing and never-self-identical practices. In this 
case, the notions of actions, agency, and practices 
need to be expanded to include the future-not-yet 
in the observed agential possibilities, which exist 
at the cultural (-historical) level and therefore are 
inherently shared. Each action not only reproduces 
culture but also produces it in new ways, even if this 
may not be perceptible immediately but only cumula-
tively over years and decades. In language, these two 
tendencies of reproducing and producing the praxis 
of speaking are “centripetal forces” and “centrifugal 
forces,” “processes of centralization and decentraliza-
tion, of unification and disunification [that] intersect 
in the utterance” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 272). With new 
artifacts available, possible actions change, with new 
actions in a praxis, the meaning of all others change 
(singular plural).
Rethinking Community and Identity from 
Difference-in-and-for-Itself
In the previous sections, I provide descriptions 
of community and identity in a second-grade math-
ematics classroom. In the context of these descrip-
tions, I articulate why we want to think the two 
concepts not as things or in terms of states but as 
processes perpetually suspended between immediate-
past and future-not-yet.
Despite warnings that communities of practice 
are characteristically different from the collectivi-
ties that are assembled into classrooms on adminis-
trative grounds rather than grounds that are found 
within communities themselves, many educa-
tors have embraced the term both proactively (for 
designing learning environments) and theoretically 
(for describing what happens within the situations 
observed). Important to me and my present consid-
erations, the very singular way in which the term 
community of practice is used leads to insurmount-
able theoretical difficulties. This is so because the 
notion of practice, if used in the singular (as evident 
in the image of centripetal force leading to trajecto-
ries from periphery to core), inherently differentiates 
according to an ontology of the same that does not 
appreciate inherent variations within the practice of 
interest. With the lack of properly theorizing prac-
tice disappears any reason for historical change to 
occur. The nonhistoric appreciation of individuals 
and human society characteristic of the medieval era 
rested precisely on the singularity of meaning. This 
position came to be exploded during the Renaissance 
era, which emphasized the ambivalence characteristic 
of the folk idiom as exemplified in the Gargantua and 
Pantagruel of Rabelais or the paintings of Hieronymus 
Bosch and Pieter Breughel the elder (Bakhtin, 1984).
A simplistic dialectical approach, which theorizes 
the Other as other than Self—its negative or nega-
tion (anti-thesis)—does not assist us in improving 
much on the concepts of community and identity 
because it thinks difference in terms of the same 11. 
This approach (abstract is a property abstracted from 
the concrete) is inverted in a dialectical materialist 
approach. Here the sensually concrete comes to be 
an expression of the concrete universal (denoting 
possibilities) realized in it (Il’enkov, 1982), which 
brings together the concrete now and the future-not-
yet in one and the same phenomenon (concept) 12. 
In Rabelais’ novel, the ambiguity of the past and 
future-not-yet is concretized in the image of death 
that simultaneously is birth or in “the vast torrent of 
praise-abuse, reflecting the contradiction of the world 
of becoming” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 419). The double 
inversion of the traditional (Latin) ecclesiastic litany 
into a torrent of ambivalent praise-abuse was typical 
of the vernacular, which thereby became a transfor-
mation of culture and society as a whole. The inver-
sion was double because high culture was not simply 
negated, but, through a positive revalorization came 
to be a bodily, positive force of transformation in and 
through the low culture and its vernacular.
In the same way, rather than thinking of students 
as being “enculturated” and “acculturated” along a 
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trajectory from the legitimate peripheral participation 
(here, in this classroom) to—for some of the students 
perhaps some time in the future—full participation 
in mathematical (geometrical) practices, I think of 
these children as constitutive members of culture. 
Membership constitutes the children as what they 
are in this classroom. Thus, whereas the authors 
of Situated Learning view change occurring as “full 
participants are replaced (directly or indirectly) by 
newcomers-become-old-timers,” I see change occur-
ring with every act and by every person (newcomer or 
old-timer); and continuity derives from the process 
of flux, whereby the new already is implicated and 
present in the old. As such, any “newcomer” already 
constitutes the mathematical culture generally as what 
it is, in all its diversity and heterogeneity. Every prac-
titioner, newcomer or old-timer, as every utterance 
for Bakhtin (1981) utterance, “serves as a point where 
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought 
to bear” (p. 272). If we were not to approach the 
problem in this way, we would not be able to explain 
how geometry (physics, chemistry) ever got of the 
ground, immediately imbued with collective sense 
given the essentially non-geometrical (non-scien-
tific) nature of practices that preceded them. That 
is, each individual produces culture (even if “only” 
the vernacular, non-mathematical part) and does not 
merely reproduce it, as s/he produces and reproduces 
the very possibilities of culture to act in this and that 
already possible way. And any non-mathematical 
way of acting constitutes the very (positive) mate-
rial, ground, and tool for mathematics to emerge and 
be transformed.
As an alternative to classical theories, we can 
think of practice in terms of a singular plural so 
that—if we want to define it as a community, the 
practice of a second-grade mathematics classroom 
is defined by the engagement collectively, as the 
plurality of patterned singular actions. This replaces 
the approach of defining a practice in terms of a 
region within which every action is part of the prac-
tice and everything falling without is not. From my 
perspective, the classroom already is mathematical 
even at the very beginning of the lesson when 
nobody exhibits mathematical practices classically 
perceived. It is mathematical in the sense that the 
correct classification of objects according to math-
ematical (geometrical) properties is already within 
the range of possibilities of its members. That is, all 
possible but not-yet-observed actions define the prac-
tice as much as those actions that already have been 
observed, allowing the new actions to be imbued 
immediately with collective intelligibility (there is no 
singular intelligibility)—because even when observed 
for a first time each action realizes a collective possi-
bility (Roth, 2007b).
Every action—concretely realized or possible—
contributes to constituting a practice, which there-
fore is a singular plural rather than a monolithic 
entity. Difference comes to be the norm because each 
action differs from every other action (produced by 
the “same” or a different individual). If it were not 
thus, we would not be able to understand or theo-
rize how apparently routine ever – repeating task 
– where every move appears to be the same as any 
previous and subsequent move – – nevertheless 
change people so that experts easily can see change 
that has occurred over longer periods of time (Lee 
& Roth, 2005). Similarly, the forms of (discursive) 
actions in this classroom changed over time, even 
though during the sorting task the teacher frequently 
repeated the same rules until, in some later session, 
children no longer sort three-dimensional geomet-
rical objects according to size or color. Change there-
fore is inherent whether a new “member,” an appren-
tice, “a” learner, “an” old-timer, or teacher produces 
an action. Any stable and historically unchanging 
practice therefore is a construction on the part of the 
researcher. Any “apprenticeship” and “encultura-
tion” and any addition or loss of member constitutes 
change. Every concrete realization of an action possi-
bility (both as new agential resources are produced, 
artifact, image of action) constitutes change and the 
transformations in the body of the agent. And it is 
precisely in and through the body of the non-math-
ematician that mathematics comes to be reborn again 
and born in new ways. This has radical consequences 
for thinking individual and community.
A “community of practice” is not but continu-
ously becomes, is a community-to-come; a Self (iden-
tity) is not, but always a Self to come 13. Individuality 
and identity are never accomplished, which makes 
it difficult and even impossible to give a precise and 
general definition thereof. This is so because “vital 
properties are never realized in their entirety, but 
forever in the process of realization; these are less 
states than tendencies” (Bergson, 1907/1967, p. 13, 
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my translation). (Identity harbors an inner contra-
diction in that there is a tendency to reproduce itself 
in each action all the while there is evident change in 
social, biological, and physical-chemical constituents 
of the body and its relations.)
Coda
A pure identity would not only be inert, empty, 
colorless, and flavorless... it would be an absurdity... A 
pure identity annuls itself, cannot identify itself. (Nancy, 
1993, p. 14)
I begin this investigation with the goal of over-
coming the aporia inherent in thinking identity and 
community on the basis of an ontology of the same. 
For the continuity that is required for identity to exist, 
we need repetition. But this repetition, this return, 
is (following Nietzsche) always a renewal, never a 
return to something that existed before; the return 
itself is the phenomenon. This allows us to under-
stand the instability of the self and of identity, which 
may be the same, but which also may be different, 
therefore opening up the possibility for change at the 
very moment of continuity.
Self is precisely what reverts to nothing else: not as 
a pure given and independent subsistence (substance), 
for such a thing does not yet revert to itself, des not turn 
upon itself in being simply what it is. Manifestation, 
to the contrary, makes a return and is nothing but 
this return. But because this return does not come to 
a presupposed substance, it is return to nothing—or 
it is not a return, and it only comes back to itself in 
throwing itself forth, at the surface, of which it will 
have been neither the underside nor the prerequisite 
ground—being thrown out of self as self, being this 
throw itself, and thereby its own passage into the other. 
(Nancy, 2002, p. 38–39)
In the entire mathematics lesson generally and 
in the excerpt involving Connor specifically, the 
teacher can be understood as having “scaffolded” 
students so that they classify their mystery objects in 
a way consistent with classical geometry. Researchers 
working with sociocultural perspective frequently 
theorize such teaching–learning situations in terms 
of the zone of proximal development, where the child 
(or less able) first comes to participate in a practice 
on an interpsychological plane prior to reproducing 
the practice on an intrapsychological plane. In the 
process, the child becomes like the other, appropri-
ates culture and becomes cultural. Such an explica-
tion, however, is fraught with logical contradictions, 
as Connor’s very participation means that something 
is happening on an intrapsychological plane. A proper 
understanding of participation requires us to think 
in terms of the non-self-identical unity of inner and 
outer, a unity that is in the first place an outer but 
“is at the same time taken up into the inner” (Hegel, 
1806/1977, p. 189 [§316], my emphasis). Here, I 
propose a different way of looking at/theorizing such 
events, beginning with a different ontology based on 
difference as such. Students such as Connor then are 
thought of as inherently different from themselves in 
a number of ways including: (a) using language of, 
from, and for the Other to express their Selves, which 
therefore inherently are other and (b) embodying the 
possibility of the very knowledgeabilities that they do 
not yet exhibit as such but that are as concrete as the 
ones that they do exhibit.
The “community,” too, is non-self-identical 
because it consists of a plurality of centers (nodes), 
each singular and therefore different from others. 
This plurality, in turn, constrains (but does not deter-
mine) the individuals that constitute it. The teacher 
of the one-room school in Moussac—which inte-
grated village and school life one in the other (Roth & 
Lee, 2006)—perfectly realized what was happening. 
Confronted by a journalist with the statement that 
the children in his class do very well without him, 
Bernard Collot responded: “Not entirely, not entirely. 
It’s not what they want, but what the collective activity 
of the class, what the events globally bring about. So 
what I try is to order these events somewhat.” This 
global activity comes about in and through the action 
of individual students, who do not merely do what 
they want to do, but do what they can do, constrained 
by the events globally.
In this article, I use a constraint satisfaction 
network as a tool for thinking about the relation 
between individual and collective that puts difference 
at the heart of Self (individual and collective identity). 
It is a very simple model to get our thinking started, 
but it is limited in numerous ways, including the fact 
that as used, relations between nodes were symmet-
rical and constant. To arrive at even more powerful 
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models for communities in constant transformation, 
one would need to open the system to external influ-
ences embedded in a system of constitutive systems, 
allow for the number of members to change, and allow 
the relational parameters both to be dissymmetric and 
changeable in time. The system then would be under 
continuous transformation and steady end states will 
not (might not) be achieved. Any additional “member” 
in the network, any additional outside influence, any 
change in the status of individual members, and any 
change in the (generally non-symmetrical) relation-
ships between pairs of members influences the trajec-
tory of the system as a whole.
The view on community and identity that I 
develop here, which is associated with a temporality 
internal to the things, is consistent both with recent 
philosophy that takes into account the dynamics of 
non-linear systems (Prigogine & Stengers, 1979) and 
with the philosophy of duration (durée [Bergson, 
1907/1969]). Thus, “universe persists. The more we 
deepen [our understanding of] the nature of time, the 
more we understand that duration [durée] signifies 
invention, creation of forms, continuous elaboration 
of the absolutely new” (p. 11, my translation).
In closing, I add a word of caution: It would not 
be good essentializing the constructs introduced 
here, for métissage (hybridization) that comes with 
non-self-identity is not something or some thing 
unless it is already understood both as process and 
mêlée, a continuous struggle inside and outside of 
any boundary one might construct. Mixture is not 
but continually arrives, deriving from a process of 
mêlée that interbreeds, crossbreeds, weaves, divides, 
exchanges; it is something that happens and over-
comes us. This, too, is the case for identity, for “if the 
métis –this métis that each of us is in his/her way– is 
someone, it is not due to an essence of métissage (a 
contradictory notion), but is insofar as the métis 
gives a punctuation, a singular configuration, to the 
without-essence of the métissage” (Nancy, 1993, 
p. 12, my translation). In fact, it is in this way for 
each (theoretical) concept, which is “always dislo-
cating itself because it is never one with itself. It is 
the same with the thesis which posits and arranges 
the concepts, the history of concepts, their forma-
tion as much as their archivization” (Derrida, 1996, 
p. 84).
Theorizing identity and community in this 
manner questions our received ways of thinking iden-
tity, precisely because it questions the ontology of the 
same. But then, there also has to be at least one way 
in which we can, from phenomenological perspec-
tives, understand our experiences. There therefore 
must be some way in which psychic systems come to 
be implicated in the process of being explicated, or, 
in other words,
there must be centres of envelopment which testify 
to the presence of individuating factors. These centres 
are clearly constituted neither by the I nor by the Self, 
but by a completely different structure belonging to the 
I–Self system. This structure should be designated by the 
name “other.” It refers only to the self for the other I and 
the other I for the self. (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 260)
Grounded in very different philosophical tradi-
tions—biblical hermeneutics, phenomenology—
other philosophers come to the same conclusions 
concerning the nature of identity: if there is anything 
such as the Self, it always and already implicates and 
implies the other (Franck, 1981; Ricœur, 1990).
In my experience, there is a lot that educational 
researchers working from sociocultural and cultural-
historical perspectives can learn from the thinking 
and theorizing that scholars in other disciplines have 
evolved, including recent French philosophy and 
Bakhtin’s work on language. Questioning one’s own 
preconceptions generally and one’s ontology more 
specifically is part of critical inquiry and a questio-
ning of the nature of the concepts we use.
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NOTES
1. Mathematically, the ensemble of nodes at time t+1 can be expressed by a vector S of dimension n and an 
operator A (dimensions n x n) that expresses the influence each node has on all the others:
S
t+1
 = A•S
t
2. In the modeling of decision-making, I used a fixed and symmetric operator A, that is, the way in which two 
nodes influence each other is symmetrical and independent of time. In real systems, both of these constraints 
need to be abandoned to allow for differential institutional power and time-dependence of or temporally chan-
ging human relationships (e.g., Roth & Middleton, 2006).
3. This is consistent with recent approaches to understanding concepts and theories: “Let’s suppose a consti-
tutive component is added to a concept: it [concept] probably will break up or undergo a complete change 
involving, perhaps, another plane [theory], at any rate, other problems” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991/2005, 
p. 34–35, my translation). The authors theorize concepts similarly to the way in which I theorize identity and 
community.
4. English does not distinguish between two forms of activities that are, in the German and Russian of the 
originators of activity theory, radically different: Tätigkeit (deyatel’nost’) refers to events that are societally 
motivated formations, whereas Aktivität (aktivnost’) denotes the fact that something is being done. Children in 
schools engage in tasks, not activity (systems); but they participate in the activity of schooling.
5. Whereas inner contradictions are central to dialectical concepts and processes responsible for the 
development of the latter, logical contradictions testify to problems in thinking and theorizing (Il’enkov, 
1960/1982).
6. In my way of understanding cultural-historical activity theory, there always are two planes, an ideal and 
a material, and the former is a (non-mirror-like, non-linear, non-causal) reflection in consciousness of the 
latter.
7. Today, Étienne Wenger (personal communication, September 12, 2007) does no longer adhere to the 
descriptions provided in Situated Learning but rather has adapted a dynamic view of community and identity 
compatible with the one I articulate here.
8. In one of the paradoxes ascribed to Zeno, Achilles never catches up with the Tortoise that has a head 
start of 100 meters, because once the warrior has covered the distance separating him from his competitor, the 
latter has moved a bit further. Achilles only asymptotically reaches the Turtoise.
9. In a documentary of French elementary school teachers (“Les instits”), Bernard Collot, the former teacher 
of the one-room school of Moussac, Poitou, said that the teacher’s problem is not learning, for children do 
learn like they grow their teeth. The teacher just helps here and there in an inherently inevitable process (see 
also Collot, 2002).
10. An extended analysis of this lesson can be found in Roth and Thom, in press.
11. Because idealities are taken up by new idealities, “newcomers” to geometry do not have to reproduce 
the phylogeny of geometry; a corollary is that earlier idealities are not necessarily recoverable at some later 
time (Husserl, 1939).
11. Throughout Das Kapital (Capital), Karl Marx practices this approach, theorizing the “general” as 
concrete (collective) possibility at the very heart of the sensually concrete (Il’enkov, 1982).
12. This issue also can be framed different, in terms of the double nature of the object: it appears twice, 
once on an ideal plane, once on the material plane, both of which simultaneously appear in activity, related in 
a dialectical fashion (Leont’ev, 1978). Others have made similar statements concerning the subject specifically 
(“The identity of the concept and singularity is properly the identity of the subject. It is the identity of nega-
tivity related to itself twice over: once in the idea, and once in concretion” [Nancy, 2002, p. 56] and for the 
activity system more generally (Roth, 2007a).
13. The French language allows associating homophonously the verb to come (à venir) with the noun future 
(avenir).
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